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Abstract. Privacy has been recognized as an important topic in the Inter-
net for a long time, and technological developments in the area of privacy
tools are ongoing. However, their focus was mainly on the individual. With
the proliferation of social network sites, it has become more evident that the
problem of privacy is not bounded by the perimeters of individuals but also
by the privacy needs of their social networks. The objective of this paper is
to contribute to the discussion about privacy in social network sites, a topic
which we consider to be severely under-researched. We propose a framework
for analyzing privacy requirements and for analyzing privacy-related data.
We outline a combination of requirements analysis, conﬂict-resolution tech-
niques, and a P3P extension that can contribute to privacy within such sites.
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1 Introduction
With networked computers becoming more and more ubiquitous around the
globe, digital social networks are gaining increasing importance for many
people’s work and leisure, as they allow for interaction independently of a
ﬁxed location. In parallel with their huge and growing acceptance among a
wide range of users, social networks (SNs) are becoming a focus of attention
for researchers and practitioners (especially in marketing). Also, govern-
ments and law enforcement (re-)awaken to the need to analyze the SNs of
terrorists and other criminals [11]. What is important to all three groups
is the huge amount of knowledge that can be discovered by investigating
people’s textual/multimedia contributions to SNs and the links they set to
their “friends” – in this sense, social network analysis is an important topic
for Knowledge Discovery for Ubiquitous User Modelling. (In this paper, we
focus on SNs on the Web and thus on the ubiquity of the Web; see [8] for a
diﬀerentiation between diﬀerent notions of “ubiquity” that are relevant for
user-centric analyses.1)
Surprisingly, a topic that has received a lot of attention over the last
years in all other areas of computer and Internet use, is scarcely attended
to in current discussions on SNs: privacy. In the privacy statements of
social network sites (SNSs), it appears that SNs are just another application
on the Web (where “of course your privacy is very important to us”); the
implication being that privacy challenges and problems are comparable to
other Web applications, such as eCommerce, and therefore can be solved
with the same privacy preservation methods.
In this position paper, we argue that while SNs share many privacy prob-
lems (and therefore solution possibilities) with other Web applications, there
are also important new challenges. Using some simple examples, we highlight
the extent of the current commercial interest in SN, point to the interest in
SNs in ubiquitous computing environments, and discuss the resulting new
challenges. Finally, we outline new research directions for currently existing
methods for privacy-preserving data mining / data analysis.
1 Many SN platforms are currently moving to mobile environments, e.g. [16]; in a
separate paper, we will investigate how the issues raised here resurface or change in mobile
SNs.
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2 Background: The importance of social net-
works
In this section, we want to give an impression of the currently perceived
importance of SNs. To this end, we focus on those examples that have
recently received the most attention, in particular in terms of the monetary
magnitude of takeover deals.
MySpace has grown to be the largest SNS in the world.2 News Corp.
invested 580 mio. USD in MySpace in mid 2005 [6], and one year later,
Google signed a 900 mio. USD deal with News Corp. for the search feature
[7].
Flickr3 and del.icio.us4 are both Yahoo!-owned; LinkedIn and Facebook
are other prominent examples of SNs.
In Germany, two deals happened in the last year. First the SNS known
as OpenBC went public and changed its name to Xing5. It has 1.5 million
users; their market capitalization reached 164 mio. Euro [27]. The second
deal was even more interesting. The publishing company Holtzbrinck has
recently bought StudiVZ6, a student community with more than 1 million
accounts, for around 100 mio. Euro [33].
The next step appears to be Second Life7. This Web site is evolving
into a parallel world, as more and more companies, universities, and users
join. What diﬀerentiates this site from all other SNSs is its own ﬂourishing
economy. People earn real money within this virtual world. Second Life is
likely to generate an enormous und unprecedented amount of social-network
data.
The ﬁrst interesting question behind all these deals is the economic ra-
tionale. Marketing and advertisement appear to be the major trigger behind
2Estimates of the real number of users vary widely. While a much-cited blog of August
2006 stated that the threshold of 100 million accounts had been surpassed [12] – a number
which was changed in all-too-many subsequent articles into more than 100 million users,
an analysis of 303 random accounts showed that only between 30 and 40% of accounts are
likely to belong to real users [4].
3close to 7 million accounts as of 10 Feb 2007, see http://www.flickr.com/
search/people/?q=+
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these deals. It seems that companies want to use three characteristics of
those sites to their advantage. First, all users voluntarily give information
about themselves. This is more information than any company could col-
lect without great expenses. Second, especially in sites for professional SNs
like Xing, the company can rely on the correctness of the data, as only a
true proﬁle enables successful networking. Finally, networks are made visible
through the analysis of simple interactions in the network, and thus provide
supporting data sets for validating the classiﬁcation of potential customers.
3 Marketing in social networks
Social Network Analysis has emerged from sociology in the 1970s. But the
ground work has been laid in the 1930s when Moreno introduced graph-
theoretic approaches to sociology. Since then the analysis of network struc-
tures based on mathematical indices has been of growing interest. With the
Internet and thus the availability of ever-growing data sets in conjunction
with the evolution of computer technology and algorithm design, social net-
work analysts are now capable of analysing structures of large networks of
small as well as large networks. This ﬁeld of research has become highly
multi-disciplinary, with research from mathematics, physics, sociology, infor-
mation sciences and economics, e.g., [3, 19, 22, 23, 38].
The most common use of user data is in marketing, for which proﬁles,
as collected in traditional eCommerce, are supported by data-mining the ex-
plicit self-descriptions, the behaviour, and the ratings of users (e.g., Amazon,
Yahoo!, Google, and Google Mail). This use is explicitly mentioned, for ex-
ample, in the MySpace privacy statement: “MySpace.com also collects other
proﬁle data including but not limited to: personal interests, gender, age, ed-
ucation and occupation in order to assist users in ﬁnding and communicating
with each other. [...] MySpace.com also logs non-personally-identiﬁable in-
formation including IP address, proﬁle information, aggregate user data, and
browser type, from users and visitors to the site. [...] This non-personally-
identiﬁable information may be shared with third-parties to provide more
relevant services and advertisements to members.”8
Marketing initiatives also actively utilize the relational information in user
proﬁles. (We believe that the under-speciﬁcation of “proﬁle” in the above
privacy statement – ‘proﬁle information is information including, but not
8http://www.myspace.com/Modules/Common/Pages/Privacy.aspx [10 Feb 2007]
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restricted to, ...’ – legally allows MySpace to subsume network information
under the proﬁle that may be handed over to third parties. To the best of
our knowledge, no legal investigation or lawsuit on this question has been
published.)
Developing a functioning marketing strategy for an SNS requires at least
two things: First, to ﬁnd out how to address people in an environment
geared towards “friends”, who also tend to be highly Internet-savvy and
hence may not respond to traditional forms of marketing. Second, to utilize
the information inherent in linkage patterns to discover and target high-value
customers.
The ﬁrst strategy can be subsumed under “Guerrilla marketing”: un-
conventional ways of performing promotional activities, often on a very low
budget, with high entertainment value and leaving people unaware that they
have been marketed to (“undercover marketing”), see [21]. This is one of
the currently most-hyped marketing strategies (see the study by the German
Society for Consumption Research, [15]), and recommendations speciﬁcally
tailored to the SNS MySpace exist [14].
However, these recommendations rely more on the creativity and moti-
vation of marketing employees to engage in an SN, than on the utilization of
formal models. The question arises what kind of information is contained in
the network structure. This is a typical question of social network analysis
[37]. Combining social network analysis and data mining, [29] proposed to
“mine the network value of customers” and to use this knowledge for “viral
marketing”. Viral marketing denotes “marketing techniques that use existing
SNs to produce increases in brand awareness, through self-replicating viral
processes, analogous to the spread of pathological and computer viruses. It
can often be word-of-mouth delivered and enhanced online; it can harness
the network eﬀect of the Internet and can be very useful in reaching a large
number of people rapidly” [40]. The core idea of [29] is to exploit measures of
“opinion leadership” inherent in SNs and to translate them into measures of
customer value. Thus, they distinguish between a customer’s intrinsic value
(based on the products s/he is likely to purchase) and the network value
(the expectation that s/he has a positive inﬂuence on others’ probabilities of
purchasing).
“Customer network value” is but one example of measures of node impor-
tance. In the social network literature, many other measures are currently
being discussed; it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter the discussion
of their relative merits.
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In ubiquitous environments, marketing companies are hoping for even
more detailed information. Ubiquitous information is expected to return
higher granularity data with strong identiﬁers like location and time, which
not only allow persons to be easily identiﬁed, but also their interactions in the
social realm to become overt, including their belonging to groups of which
they are not even aware of. An example is a speciﬁc group of commuters
who pass by strategically-placed digital billboards. The collection and dis-
semination of ubiquitous information will allow advertising and marketing
companies to optimally make use of the time and places at which persons
may best succumb to advertisement, as well as to identify those groups or
individuals best suited for various viral marketing strategies.
4 Privacy challenges in social networks
In what sense is all this a privacy problem? First, because being an SNS user
implies being a Web (platform) user, all the problems arise that are already
well-known and documented in the Internet at large, e.g., [35]. Summarized
brieﬂy, personal data accrue and can be utilized not only for the primary
purposes for which they were collected (ﬁnding and communicating with
other users, cf. the MySpace privacy statement).9 They can be utilized also
for secondary (from the perspective of the user) purposes that are covered in
the SNS’s terms of use and in that sense accepted by users. Such purposes
are usually targeted marketing. However, they can also be utilized for other
purposes – illegally or legally for commercial purposes, as many examples,
for example from eCommerce, show [26], and by law enforcement, secret
services, etc. (the explicit targeting also of information marked as ‘private’
in law-enforcement analyses of data has been conﬁrmed by leading politicians
[28]).
Technically, the use of SNS data for novel purposes is even simpler than in
traditional eCommerce. The very essence of social media is that user-proﬁle
information is public (as opposed to, for example, Amazon’s usage data which
9Even accesses that at ﬁrst sight look like a legitimate usage in this sense are not
without problems, and people are beginning to be wary of this. The following is a good
example of the new intricacies of the shifting notions of “private” and “public”: boyd [10]
pointed out that many US teenagers (due to their heavy usage of MySpace both the most
sophisticated and the most vulnerable users of SNSs today) feel strongly about preserving
a certain form of privacy: they want to be visible and searchable for their friends but not
their parents.
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are an important and secret business asset of the company). Moreover, the
data often carries semantic markup and/or is presented in a uniform (hence
easily minable) manner, for example as RSS feeds. Thus, while the legal
issues at this level are the same in SNSs as in other sites, technical (ab)uses
become simpler.
So at ﬁrst sight, social-network data describe a person in the same way
as other data. For example, a “person” record in a database may contain
the attributes “health status”, “favourite book”, and a (probably set-valued)
attribute “friend”. The values of these attributes are properties of the data
subject of this record (say, person A).
For the subsequent analysis, we propose to extend the common classiﬁ-
cation of conﬁdentiality levels into “private data” and “public data” agreed
upon between the customer (user) and the site operator. We propose to use
two further levels that we call “community data” and “group data”, speciﬁc
to SNSs:
Private data is disclosed to the SNS operator for its internal purposes only.
This data must not be disclosed unless explicit consent is given. An
example is the user’s email address provided upon registration.
Group data is disclosed to the SNS operator and can be accessed by other
users of the same SNS that are also in the same group as the user: data
disclosure is limited to the group. Here we imagine messages shared
among a certain group, almost like a closed mailing-list.
Community data has been disclosed to the SNS operator and is available
to all registered and logged-in users of the SNS. The data is not ac-
cessible for anonymous SNS visitors. Examples are the user’s online
status, her contacts, her member page details, photos, etc.
Public data has been disclosed to the SNS operator and is made accessible
for all SNS visitors, including anonymous visitors: this may include
the fact that the user is registered in the SNS, her user name, or her
guestbook.
The concrete details and the application of these conﬁdentiality levels
to data depends on the SNSs implementation. One may not always ﬁnd
disclosure examples of all levels.
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A priori, the site operator has diverging privacy goals. On the one hand,
he needs enough personal user information to be disclosed in order to attract
new users. On the other hand, some information must be kept at the com-
munity level to create suﬃcient beneﬁt from community membership. At the
time of signing up, the perceived beneﬁts, including access to secured per-
sonal information, must exceed registration costs. A typical situation is that
one searches for someone’s email address by entering her name in a search
engine. The contact is found in an SNS like Xing, but the email address is
secured to registered users.
The privacy challenges in the Web portrayed so far arise from the operator-
user interaction. In the context of SNSs, new problems arise because of the
semantics of social-network relations, i.e. the user-user interaction. As an
example, consider friendship relations which are – at least in real life – sym-
metric. Thus, the record of person A that states that person B is a friend also
contains information that is part of B’s record. Another example is groups of
users. Group attributes may be changed by any member of the group. A user
whose group membership is public thereby discloses interests, preferences, or
other personal information (for a worked-out example, see Section 6). This
means that if A discloses information about himself or groups including him-
self, he (whether willingly or inadvertently) also discloses information about
someone else. Expressed diﬀerently, A’s treatment of his privacy has a direct
eﬀect on B’s privacy.
Such social-network data usually concern people who also have an ID
in the same system, i.e. this privacy dependency is a problem that aﬀects
diﬀerent users of the same system.
In addition, problems arise when systems support the interaction with the
world outside the system. For example, Google Mail (Gmail) users consent to
their emails’ data being analyzed by Google; however, all incoming mails of
a Google Mail account (whether sent by another Gmail user or by somebody
else) are also analysed. Thus, A’s treatment of his privacy also has direct
external eﬀects on the privacy of C, who is a non-user of the system.
The distinction between “in the system” and “outside the system” van-
ishes in case of loosely coupled networks where members may engage in re-
lationships spontaneously and without a central authority. An example are
the “friend-of-a-fried” nets built by publishing FOAF ﬁles [31]. A FOAF ﬁle
describes a persons contact information, as well as his/her relationships to
other people and details about them in an RDF-based standard format. As
users publish their friendship details autonomously, symmetry of relation-
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ships is not enforced. However, revelation of private information is likely to
occur for instance by combining real names and email addresses, and legal
requirements apply [13].
Because SNs are (by deﬁnition) built on interaction, they are typically
open systems, and have certain semantic characteristics. Each privacy-
related declaration has eﬀects beyond the interaction between one individual
data subject and one data collector, eﬀects that may concern a number of
stakeholders who may or may not be users of the same system.
In a quest for solutions, we identify two essential steps: First, the poten-
tial privacy conﬂicts that arise by social-network interaction must be iden-
tiﬁed. To do this in a systematic way, methods from requirements analysis
are needed. This includes methods for conﬂict resolution a priori. Second,
privacy preferences and requirements must be formalized suﬃciently such
that software can automatically detect problems, alert the user, and assist
her. In data analysis routines, mechanisms need to be implemented to en-
force privacy requirements. We believe that this should be based on existing
standards or de facto standards for privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs),
in order to make a large-scale adoption of such technological solution ap-
proaches realistic. In the following two sections, we investigate the two parts
of our solution proposal in turn.
This method of analysis draws attention to an important question: what
“privacy” actually means. In the following, we emphasize that privacy is not
just about data protection, or about restricting the access to, or the process-
ing of, personal data. It is also about who can edit which data (e.g., infor-
mation about individuals or groups), how people want to and can interact
with a site and other users (e.g., identiﬁed, pseudonymized, or anonymized),
i.e. what diﬀerent private, public, and shared spaces they can create for their
lives, how they can separate and share identities between these spaces, etc.
For an extended discussion of our notion of privacy, see [17].
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5 Identifying privacy conﬂicts in the inter-
action of requirements for social network
sites
As mentioned in the examples above, identifying privacy conﬂicts in SNSs
is not trivial. In order to do this in a systematic manner, we make use
of the Multilateral Security Requirements Analysis (MSRA) method [17].
The main idea of the MSRA method is to consider the security and privacy
interests or needs of all stakeholders related to the system. An important
aspect of the method is to identify interest conﬂicts among these stakeholders
and develop mechanisms for negotiating these conﬂicts. Here we introduce
aspects of conﬂict identiﬁcation and negotiation mechanisms in multilateral
security requirements analysis.
5.1 Stakeholders and their privacy interests
In MSRA, stakeholders of a system are all persons who have some functional,
knowledge, security or privacy interest in the system. This encompasses all
persons involved in the conception, production, use and maintenance of the
system. Stakeholders encompass more than users (those who will use the
functionality of the system).
Stakeholders, for example, include all persons who have a privacy interest
in the system. This could be stakeholders representing legal requirements
as well as non-users whose data is processed by the system – i.e. patients
in a Hospital Information System or customers in a Customer Relationship
Management System. As mentioned in Section 4, the sender of an email to a
Gmail account may count as a stakeholder of the Gmail platform, although
she is not a user of that platform. This stakeholder is likely to have diﬀerent
privacy interests towards the Gmail platform than a user or provider of the
platform.
The inclusion of an external sender of an email as a stakeholder of an
email platform also points to the fact that further stakeholders may be ac-
quired once the system is running. Subsuming the privacy interests of all
prospective stakeholders is not possible during the development of the sys-
tem. Nevertheless, the potential of discovering new stakeholders requires
the conception of negotiation mechanisms during the development process
that anticipate potential divergences in privacy interests during run-time.
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Moreover, the introduction of new stakeholders and their requirements of-
ten demands a review of all security and other requirements and hence an
iterative approach.
The analysis of the stakeholders security and privacy requirements can
be compared to viewpoints-oriented requirements analysis [32]. The collec-
tion of diﬀerent privacy interests from the viewpoints of the stakeholders
results in a complex list of requirements that are likely to include inconsis-
tencies, repetitions and conﬂicts. To identify these, requirements interaction
management is necessary.
5.2 Identiﬁcation of privacy conﬂicts through require-
ments interaction management
Requirements interaction [30] can be understood through direct comparisons
of requirements descriptions, or through the analysis of the underlying com-
ponents that can satisfy these requirements. According to the deﬁnition in
[30], a requirement R is satisﬁed by a component C if the component ex-
hibits all the properties speciﬁed in the requirement. There may be degrees
of satisfaction of a requirements and this can be mapped to a range:
Deﬁnition. SatR : C → [0,1]
As a result, requirements interaction can be deﬁned as follows:
Perceived interaction : Two requirements, labeled R1 and R2 interact if
and only if the satisfaction of one requirement aﬀects the satisfaction
of the other.
Operational interaction : If component C1 satisﬁes R1 and component
C2 satisﬁes R2, and the run-time behaviour of C1 aﬀects the run-time
behaviour of C2, then C1 interacts with C2, and indirectly R1 interacts
with R2.
The deﬁnition of operational interaction points to the dependency be-
tween the requirements and design phases of systems development. Interac-
tions may have diﬀerent degrees of intensity, and run-time interactions may
have varying probabilities of appearing. Interactions between requirements
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may be positively correlated (they strengthen each other), negatively corre-
lated (they are in conﬂict), the correlation may be unspeciﬁed (the eﬀect is
unclear but exists) or non-existent (no eﬀect).
Privacy requirements can be articulated in terms of security goals [17].
Security goals also interact, and may be correlated positively or negatively.
For example, the anonymous use of a resource and the accountability for that
use – the possibility to prove to a third party the use of the same resource –
are conﬂicting requirements. Design solutions that partially satisfy both are
possible; we will refer to these later.
Example 1. In an SNS, the stakeholders may have conﬂicting interests concerning
the authoring and editing of entries:
R1 The members of the SN may edit parts of entries of other authors that contain
information about themselves.
R2 The authors of entries want to be the sole editors of their own entries.
R3 All members of the SN want the accountability of authors for all their entries
towards all other members.




















































Figure 1: Requirements interaction for a social network
Figure 1 gives an overview of the interactions between these initial requirements
for various sets of stakeholders. For example, the anonymity requirement R4 is
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obviously in conﬂict with all the other requirements. If a user uses the services
of the SNS anonymously, it is not possible to prove that information in an entry
is about oneself (requirement R1), it is not possible to authenticate the users
who edited entries through their identities (requirement R2), and accountability
for requirements is not possible through user identities (requirement R3). Hence,
some negotiation is necessary to resolve the negative and unspeciﬁed correlations
between the diﬀerent requirements. Resolutions of conﬂicts may also introduce
new conﬂicts. Thus, an iterative requirements interaction management approach
is needed.
5.3 Activities and negotiation techniques
In [30], Robinson et al. suggest six activities:
Requirements partitioning : a subset of the requirements are analysed
depending on scenarios, stakeholder views etc (“episodes” in MSRA).
Interaction identiﬁcation : the diﬀerent kinds of correlations between the
requirements are identiﬁed.
Interaction focus : the requirements are prioritized, since not all interac-
tions can be resolved.
Resolution generation : diﬀerent approaches are used to generate resolu-
tions. A value-oriented approach considers alternative goals, whereas
a structure-oriented approach considers new operators and resources.
Resolution selection : diﬀerent methods are used to prioritize generated
resolutions, for example, utility theory or decision theory.
Requirements update : further stakeholders and/or requirements may
become apparent through the requirements interaction management
process; these are considered in this activity.
Based on their study of approximately conﬂict resolution 30 methods, the
authors suggest the following methods for resolution generation:
Relaxation : the conﬂicting requirements are relaxed or generalized to
avoid conﬂict.
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Reﬁnement : the conﬂicting requirements are partially satisﬁed.
Compromise : a compromise is found between the requirements.
Restructuring : a set of methods are used to modify the conﬂict context,
which includes assumptions and related requirements.
Other : conﬂict resolution is postponed, either to later stages of the devel-
opment, or the attempt is abandoned entirely.
Example 1 (contd.) In the example, the conﬂict between the requirements R1
through R3 with the anonymity requirement R4 can be solved with one of these
resolution methods. A relaxation of the anonymity requirements can be reached
by replacing anonymity by pseudonyms of diﬀerent strength. Reﬁnement could
be reached by allowing certain services to be used anonymously, i.e. authoring
reserved entries anonymously but using services for which accountability is impor-
tant with registered pseudonyms. This could also be seen as a compromise. In
restructuring, one could divide the services of the SNS into those which include
anonymous interactions, and others which exclude anonymous interactions. Fur-
ther restructuring could be done through keeping the community so small and
protected that anonymity ceases to be a requirement.
Recognizing interactions in privacy and security requirements written in
natural language is not a trivial activity. We need an adequate modelling
language that makes the identiﬁcation of interactions easier [24]. Further, the
interaction between the high-level security requirements of the stakeholders
and the data that are related to these requirements needs to be analyzed,
which inevitably requires inference analysis to be undertaken.
6 Enhancing privacy in social network sites
using P3P
What happens after requirements have been analyzed and conﬂicts identiﬁed?
How can technology help to resolve conﬂicts during run time? In this section,
we focus on restructuring: a modiﬁcation of the SNS application logic (and
hence the interaction/conﬂict context) that can help avoid the occurrence of
conﬂicts. We concentrate on privacy in the sense of data protection, i.e. as
a restriction on data access and data processing.
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Appropriate measures need to be taken to satisfy privacy requirements
in an operational SNS. This includes the conception and adaptation of tech-
nologies and processes, mainly privacy languages and tools to interpret and
enforce these languages. The design goal is twofold:
First, we need mechanisms to ensure that data/information of one privacy
level must not be made accessible via data/information of a lower privacy
level. For example one should not be able to perform (data) inferences [34]
towards personal information that is private on a “community level”, from
personal information that is private on a “public level”. The AOL privacy
breach [5] gives evidence that trivial anonymization is insuﬃcient for prevent-
ing data inferences that may even lead to the identiﬁcation of individuals.
Second, we need mechanisms that prevent users from disclosing personal
information about other users inside an SNS.
Both objectives should be addressed within the existing technological
and legal infrastructure of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs), Privacy
Protocols (especially P3P and APPEL / XPref), and mandatory legislation.
P3P, the Platform for Privacy Preferences, is a protocol designed to in-
form Web users about the data-collection practices of Web sites. It provides
a way for a Web site to encode its data-collection and data-use practices in a
machine-readable XML format known as a P3P policy [39]. Moreover, P3P
enables Web users to understand what data will be collected by sites they
visit, how that data will be used, and what data/uses they may “opt-out” of
or “opt-in” to [39]. An SNS operator will post a P3P policy on its Web site
to communicate its data handling practices. Visitors and users can receive
this policy in a textually presented format. Their decision whether to send
data to the site or not can be supported by APPEL rules: APPEL, A P3P
Preference Exchange Language, allows a user to express her preferences in a
set of preference rules, interpreted by her user agent to make automated or
semi-automated decisions regarding the acceptability of P3P Privacy Policies
[20]. XPref [1] is a newer privacy preference language, more expressive than
APPEL yet easier to use.
In a P3P policy, one or several statements describe data practices that
are applied to particular types of data. A statement indicates recipients,
usage purposes, and a retention time for data elements. Every potential data
usage must be indicated by an appropriate statement; hence statements span
a superset over the actually implemented data usage. P3P hereby translates
the privacy concepts of, e.g., European privacy legislation and the OECD
Fair Information Practices into a machine-readable policy.
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Example 2. Consider the P3P fragment below, which expresses the data collection
and usage scenario outlined in section 4. A professional SN collects the user-
name, publicly accessible, and the details about the user’s job, the latter being
secured. Users may join special interest groups based on their industrial and de-
partmental focus, e.g. “Helpdesk Professionals Group”, “Data Protection Oﬃcers
Group”, or “CEO VIP Club”. Group membership, expressed by the data cate-
gories <political/><preference/> is public.



















However, group details must be public so that users can decide whether they
want to join a given group. Even if these details are hidden, the group name is
often explicit enough (“Data Protection Oﬃcers Group”).
Thus, we can formulate the following inference rule with inﬁx relation notation
of is member in, focusses on, and works in:
∀g:Group,u:User,d:Department :
u is member in g ∧ g focusses on d ⇒ u works in d
Using this data inference rule, one can infer a user’s department from her group
membership details; the group details are public and can be accessed freely. The
conﬁdentiality of the user’s department is not guaranteed any more, and the P3P
Policy does not accurately reﬂect that the recipient of the department information
is eﬀectively broadened to <public/>.
To avoid such degradation of privacy levels, we have proposed an exten-
sion to P3P, the INFERENCE element, together with a logic that blocks
the use of data described in the INFERENCE [36]. The new INFERENCE
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element, realized by P3P’s built-in extension mechanism and thus backward-
compatible, codes a data inference inside the P3P policy. A user-agent may
parse the inference rule and alert the user to possible privacy breaches. Inside
an analysis framework, inference rules can be used to lift privacy levels. For
instance, access to the group membership information should be restricted
to <ours/>.
Example 2 (contd.) In P3P, the inference rule is coded as follows:




<CONSEQUENCE> If group membership is known , group details let













Example 3. We now consider the second problem of personal information about
oneself to be disclosed by other users. Again, we observe <public/> as a new
recipient where a higher privacy level was intended. As a remedy, the users A and
B have to agree on a privacy policy that B will not disclose their friendship. Note
that a privacy policy between A and the SNS operator does not cover B’s privacy
obligations. Nevertheless, the operator may provide privacy policy templates and
implement measures to ensure that B does not make public his friendship to A
unless A has given her consent.
The choice between an open (public) or hidden (private) friendship can
be oﬀered via the mechanisms provided in [25]. Similar to the coding of
inferences in P3P, diﬀerent usage options for the SNS are coded in a single
valid P3P Privacy Policy. Therefore, a user agent can seamlessly parse those
alternative scenarios of friendship making and select the most appropriate
option for the user (see Listing 3 below). The policy negotiation and the
choice of the right option is automated so that the “overhead” is transparent
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to the SNS user. The necessary XML schemas and namespaces are available,
see [25].
Example 3 (contd.) The scenarios of friendship making are described in P3P as
follows:
Listing 3: Diﬀerent friendship alternatives (public/hidden)
are coded in a single P3P Privacy Policy
<POLICY xmlns:PRINT="http://preibusch.de/namespaces/PRINT/PRINT.xsd">
<EXTENSION optional="no">
<PRINT:NEGOTIATION -GROUP -DEF id="friendship"
standard="public_friend" fallback="public_friend" selected="public_friend"
description="Choosing public (open) or private (hidden) friendship" />
</EXTENSION>
<STATEMENT> <EXTENSION optional="no">
<PRINT:NEGOTIATION -GROUP id="public_friend" groupid="friendship"
serviceuri="/make-friend/public"
description="Make this user a public friend of yours" />
</EXTENSION>




<other -purpose> friendship </other -purpose> </PURPOSE>
<RETENTION> <indefinitely/> </RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP> <DATA ref="#user.login.id"/> </DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
<STATEMENT> <EXTENSION optional="no">
<PRINT:NEGOTIATION -GROUP id="hidden_friend" groupid="friendship"
serviceuri="/make-friend/hidden"
description="Make this user a hidden friend of yours" />
</EXTENSION>
<CONSEQUENCE>Other visitors will not see that you are friends</CONSEQUENCE>
<RECIPIENT> <ours/> </RECIPIENT>
<PURPOSE> <contact/>
<other -purpose> friendship </other -purpose> </PURPOSE>
<RETENTION> <indefinitely/> </RETENTION>
<DATA-GROUP> <DATA ref="#user.login.id"/> </DATA-GROUP>
</STATEMENT>
</POLICY>
As the friendship making process is realized through the SNS, the SNS
operator can record the chosen option and integrate enforcement mechanisms
into the site [2]. When displaying a user’s friends list, only public friends
will be listed. The scenario demonstrates that privacy enhancements can be
implemented without disturbing the user. The standard-compliant coding
in machine-readable privacy policies allows for computer-supported decision-
making. Moreover, the content presentation becomes semantics-driven as it
is governed by semantic policies; policies will provide for privacy even if the
friendship may no longer exist.
17Discussion Paper 698
7 Conclusion
S. Preibusch, B. Hoser, S. G¨ urses, and B. Berendt
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that privacy in SNSs is of growing interest as
these sites gain economic relevance. As companies buy SNSs for the inherent
marketing potential and sites like Second Life create parallel economic worlds,
it should be of interest to the user and even more to researchers and software
developers how to implement techniques that provide users with “digital
privacy”. If this is not achieved, a backlash could result as we observed for
eCommerce in the late 1990s.
While SNSs already use some privacy functions and have their own pri-
vacy policies, these are still centered around the individual, although SNSs
clearly take into account network eﬀects. If for example one user reveals data
about himself, as well as a list of his friends, this “network” information could
lead to revelations that had not been intended by his friends. Such leaks can
prove bothersome or disastrous for individual users. In addition, these users
may lose trust in the SNS and leave, which in turn creates problems for the
operators of the site and the marketing initiatives ﬁnancing them (this hap-
pened in one of the sites mentioned in Section 2, StudiVZ). This shows that
both sides have a vital interest in eﬀective privacy measures. In this paper,
we aimed at contributing to the discussion about privacy in SNSs, a topic
which we consider to be severely under-researched. We proposed a frame-
work for analyzing privacy requirements and for analyzing privacy-related
data.
To build on a comprehensive notion of “privacy”, we investigated desired
properties of (inter)actions on the one hand and issues of data conﬁdentiality
on the other hand. We developed a data conﬁdentiality taxonomy to capture
the privacy speciﬁcities in SNs: The (intended) interaction with other users,
especially with “friends” inside the network, can result in personal data be-
ing disclosed by third parties and in other data being inferred from users’
communication patterns. We outlined methods for multilateral requirements
analysis for identifying, negotiating, and – if possible – resolving conﬂicts
already during system design. The dichotomous distinction between “public
data” and “private data” was reﬁned to a set of tiered conﬁdentiality levels.
We provided an extension to the Privacy Policy language P3P to code data
inferences that may result in conﬁdentiality level breaches. The machine-
readable coding of inferences allows for a better-informed consent, as the
user becomes aware of side-eﬀects. In particular, symmetric relations like
“friendships” are potential privacy pitfalls as one user’s disclosure makes it
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possible to draw conclusions about other users’ data. We provided mecha-
nisms how privacy policies can be integrated seamlessly into the interaction
among users. These policies give semantics to conﬁdentiality and can be
enforced by SNS operators.
Many challenges lie ahead. They include further investigations of the for-
mal characteristics of the proposed inference (avoidance) schemes, practical
applications and the development of best practices in requirements analysis
and conﬂict resolution, and last but not least extensive user studies on the
usability of concrete, implemented privacy options (these studies could build
on the methods of, e.g., [9, 16, 18].
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